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SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS:
MAINTAINING EQUALITY UNDER TITLE VII-
WRIGHTSON V. PIZZA HUT OF AMERICA, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' namely Title VII, was a
legislative victory for proponents of workplace equality. Title VII,
which forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee
"because of [his/her] ... sex," has since afforded numerous employees
redressibility for sexual harassment.2 On October 31, 1996, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of America, Inc.,3 extended Title VII's protective reach to claimants
alleging harassment by a perpetrator of the same sex, provided that the
perpetrator is homosexual.4 The Wrightson decision highlighted the
disagreement between those federal appellate courts that preclude
same-sex harassment claims and those that recognize such claims.
This Note begins with a synopsis of the facts and procedural holdings
of Wrightson. A discussion follows of the influential cases and legisla-
tion from which Wrightson evolved. Finally, an evaluation and analysis
of the court's holding and dissent is presented, focusing on the case's
value and future implications.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
From March 1993 until March 1994, sixteen-year old Arthur Wright-
son was employed as a cook and waiter by a local Pizza Hut restaurant
in North Carolina.5 At that time, Wrightson's immediate supervisor was
Bobby Howard, an openly homosexual male.6 Nearly eight months after
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2. Title VII's text reads:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
Iii (emphasis added).
3. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F. Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
4. Id. at 144.
5. Id. at 139.
6. Id.
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Wrightson began working at the restaurant, Howard and the other ho-
mosexual male employees began to sexually harass Wrightson as well as
the other heterosexual male employees.7 Howard made sexual advances
towards Wrightson, explicitly describing homosexual sex in an attempt
to pressure Wrightson into participating in the described acts.8 Howard
also harassed Wrightson by provocatively rubbing against Wrightson,
squeezing Wrightson's buttocks, and pulling Wrightson's pants out in
order to look down them.9 Likewise, Howard harassed the other het-
erosexual male employees, attempting to kiss one of them as the em-
ployee left the restaurant."0 This harassment was not directed, however,
towards any female or homosexual male employees."
Wrightson and his heterosexual male co-workers clearly insisted that
Howard stop the harassment, threatening to file formal complaints.
Additionally, the restaurant's manager and assistant manager were cog-
nizant of the harassment, personally witnessing the abusive conduct sev-
eral times." The manager even held a meeting with Howard and the
others during which the manager informed them that their actions
"violated federal law.' 4 Nevertheless, the harassment persisted.5
In August of 1995, Wrightson filed suit against Pizza Hut in the
7. Id. After a male employee was hired at this particular Pizza Hut, the homosexual
employees routinely launched an effort to determine the new employee's sexual preference.
Id. If the employee was heterosexual, pressure was then placed upon the new employee to
engage in homosexual acts. Id.
8. Id. The complaint alleged that:
[D]uring working hours [Howard] made numerous comments to [Wrightson] of a
graphic and explicit nature wherein Howard ... would graphically describe his ho-
mosexual lifestyle and homosexual sex, would make sexual advances towards
[Wrightson], would subject [Wrightson] to vulgar homosexual sexual remarks, innu-
endoes and suggestions, and would otherwise embarrass and humiliate [Wrightson]
by questioning [him] as to why he did not wish to engage in homosexual activity and
would encourage and invite [Wrightson] to engage in such homosexual activity.
Id. at 139-40. Although not as extreme as Howard's behavior, the other homosexual male
employees at Pizza Hut made similar sexually explicit comments to Wrightson. Id. at 140.
9. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995). Howard also repeatedly ran his fingers through Wrightson's hair
and massaged Wrightson's shoulders. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The manager of the restaurant, Jennifer Tyson, "admitted to Wrightson's
mother that [Tyson] was aware of the harassment and also that Howard's actions constituted
sexual harassment, but [Tyson] contended that she was unable to control Howard." Id.
14. "After this meeting, the homosexual employees joked about the possibility of a fed-
eral sexual harassment suit, and the harassment continued and 'intensified."' Id. at 140-41.
15. Id. at 141.
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United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
alleging sexual harassment and discrimination in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as the negligent retention of an
employee and the intentional infliction of emotional distress."6 In re-
sponse, Pizza Hut filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and for lack of jurisdiction.'7 The district court dismissed Wrightson's
complaint, finding "no evidence that Congress intended to prohibit in-
tra-gender harassment in enacting Title VII.' 8 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, ap-
plying Title VII's protection to same-sex sexual harassment claims only
in the limited circumstance that "the perpetrator of the ... harassment is
homosexual. " 9
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Since Title VII's passage, numerous sexual discrimination claims
have been filed in federal courts. However, plaintiffs have recently
filed an increasing number of non-traditional discrimination claims, al-
leging discrimination by a supervisor of the same sex." The inconclusive
legislative history regarding Title VII, as well as the inconsistent and ir-
reconcilable law preceding Wrightson, has left the circuits "hopelessly
divided.'
A. The Statute
Fundamentally, the courts have struggled to ascertain a single inter-
pretation of Title VII's text.? In the days leading up to Title VII's pas-
16. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am. Inc., 909 F. Supp. 367,367 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
17. Id. at 368.
18. Id.
19. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141, 144 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909
F. Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Cullen P. Cowley, Comment, Same-Gender Harassment and Homosexuality
in Title VII Sexual Harassment Litigation, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 443, 444 n.5
(1996); Pamela J. Papish, Comment, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay?
The False Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 201,
203 n.7 (1996).
21. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) ("[T]he lower federal courts which have
[addressed this issue] are hopelessly divided.").
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
77 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)
("The general language used by Congress in Title VII makes its intentions with respect to the
actionability of same sex conduct ambiguous at best.").
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
sage, there was minimal congressional discussion regarding the last-
minute addition of the word "sex" to the bill's list of forbidden discrimi-
nation bases.' Commentators have suggested that the true motive be-
hind the word's addition was a faction of conservative legislators' strate-
gic attempt to defeat the bill by splitting the liberal votes.2' However,
the effort to build up opposition to the bill backfired.2 Title VII passed
as amended, resulting in an unfortunate lack of concrete legislative his-
tory to use as an interpretation tool.' 6
The limited congressional record does, however, include discussion
of "do[ing] some good for the minority sex." 2' Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court has "interpreted [Title VII's] broad language to
protect both men and women."'  In Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 29 the Court examined an insurance plan that
afforded a more comprehensive pregnancy-benefits package to married
female employees than to the spouses of married male employees. 3° The
Court held that the plan discriminated against males, violating Title
VII In reaching this conclusion, the Court opined that although
"congressional discussion focused on the needs of female members of
the workforce ... [t]his does not create a 'negative inference' limiting the
scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment.
3 2
Thus, the congressional conversations that perhaps instigated the addi-
tion of the word "sex" to Title VII did not implicitly limit Title VII's
scope.
While the Supreme Court has not to date addressed the issue of
same-sex sexual harassment, the Court has suggested that the word
"sex" in Title VII is interchangeable with the word "gender," precluding
23. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-
84 (1964)).
24. Amy Shahan, Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of Action for Same-
Sex Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 507,510 (1996).
25. Id.
26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64; see also Shahan, supra note 24, at 510 ("Perhaps the man-
ner in which Congress included the term 'sex' explains why Congress neglected to define the
term.").
27. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (emphasis added).
28. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749-50 (citation omitted).
29. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
30. Id. at 671-72. The plan was examined under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
which amended Title VII in 1978. Id. Thus, as amended, Title VII's prohibition of sex dis-
crimination included discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. Id.
31. Id. at 676.
32- Id. at 679.
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a broad interpretation of "sex" that would include discrimination based
upon sexual orientation.33
B. The Cases
Despite the lack of formal legislative guidance, sexual harassment
has long been acknowledged as a form of sexual discrimination under
Title VIIL The legal community routinely recognizes two types of sex-
ual harassment claims: quid pro quo claims and "hostile work environ-
ment" claims.35 A quid pro quo claim for sexual harassment exists when
"sexual consideration is demanded in exchange for job benefits."36 Al-
ternatively, as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, a "hostile work environment" claim is
not necessarily set against the background of economic or career ma-
nipulation.37 Instead, such a claim is based upon unreasonable, and per-
haps intangible, interferences With an employee's work performance or
environment, including "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, and other verbal or physical [sexual] conduct."'
33. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749 n.1 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-
41 (1989) (using "gender" and "sex" interchangeably)).
34. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), § 615.2 (a) (1987). The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission's Guidelines, while not binding upon any court of law, are highly instructive
due to the commission's statutory authority to administer Title VII. See, e.g., Christopher W.
Deering, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-examine the Legal Underpinnings of
Title VII's Ban on Discrimination "Because of' Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 237 n.37 (1996);
see also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question, when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.").
35. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
36. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1989). A prima facie case
for quid pro quo sexual harassment has five elements: (1) the employee is a member of a
"protected group"; (2) the employee has experienced unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment was "because of" the claimant's sex; (4) the harassment "affected tangible aspects
of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"; and (5) the
employer knew of the harassment and took no action. Id.; Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254
(4th Cir. 1983).
37. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67
38. Id. at 65. The elements of a prima facie "hostile work environment" claim are: (1)
that the questionable conduct was unwelcome; (2) that the harassment was "because of" the
victim's sex; (3) that the harassment was "sufficiently severe to create a hostile work envi-
ronment"; and (4) that a basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. Swentek v.
USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). "The rationale for the hos-
tile-environment doctrine is that sufficiently abusive harassment adversely affects a 'term,
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII." Yeary v. Goodwill
Indus.-Knoxville, 107 F.3d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
1997]
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In 1994, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,39 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to di-
rectly address the issue of same-sex sexual harassment.0 The male
claimant in Garcia alleged that another male employee had sexually
grabbed the claimant on several occasions." Devoting a mere paragraph
to its analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that such a claim was not vi-
able under Title VIIL According to the court, the repeated, provoca-
tive grabbing of a male employee by a male supervisor "could not in any
event constitute sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII.
43
The Fifth Circuit, by failing to elaborate on its reasoning, set precedent
for unilaterally denying relief to all non-traditional claimants44 without
providing more than a scintilla of independent, analytical guidance for
future courts.
Nearly two years later, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board Of
Supervisors,45 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief to a
heterosexual male employee who alleged that other male employees
had verbally and physically assaulted him in a sexual manner.4 Of par-
ticular significance is the fact that the McWilliams claimant never set
forth any allegations or factual propositions regarding the harassers'
sexual orientation.47 Thus, the Fourth Circuit ultimately rejected the
feasibility of the "hostile work environment" harassment claim because
both the perpetrator and the claimant were presumably heterosexual
39. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. Id. Prior to Garcia, federal district courts from various circuits had struggled with
the issue. See Deering, supra note 34, at 248. Most of the early cases seemed to suggest that a
same-sex sexual harassment claim would be within Title VII's reach. Id.
41. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.
42 Id. at 451-52. The court ultimately dismissed the case on other grounds. Id.
43. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
44. Id. The court made this clear when it succinctly stated that "[h]arassment by a male
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination." Id. at 451-52
(citation omitted).
45. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
46. Id. at 1193. The conduct in question included: "[tying] McWilliams' hands together,
blindfold[ing] him, and forc[ing] him to his knees"; placing a male employee's "finger in
McWilliams' mouth to stimulate oral sex"; placing "a broomstick to McWilliams' anus" while
a male employee exposed his genitals to McWilliams; and fondling McWilliams. Id.
47. Id. at 1195 n.5. In a thought-provoking dissent, Judge Michael called into question
the majority's apparent requirement that a harasser and a victim be of different sexual orien-
tations. Id. at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting). Acknowledging that while evidence of one's
(particularly of a harasser's) sexual preference could be relevant to a claim, Judge Michael
reasoned that "it should not be elevated to a required element of the plaintiff's proof." Id.
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males.' In coming to this conclusion, the court focused on Title VII's
critical "because of" language49 and questioned whether "heterosexual-
male-on-heterosexual-male" sexual behavior, although offensive and in-
sulting, could ever satisfy the requisite causal element of Title VII.O
The court concluded that the "shameful" type of behavior alleged in
McWilliams could have transpired "because of' many things, including
the claimant's "prudery" or "vulnerability" and the perpetrator's
"sexual perversion," "insecurity," or "meanness of spirit."" But, the
court reasoned the behavior had not transpired "specifically 'because of
the victim's sex.
52
The McWilliams court specifically drew attention to the limits of its
holding, indicating it would not necessarily bar quid pro quo claims of
"discrimination by adverse employment decisions (hiring, firing, etc.)"
involving two same-sex heterosexuals.53 The court also emphasized that
the holding did not claim to address any type of same-sex sexual har-
assment claim where the perpetrator and/or the claimant were homo-
sexual or bisexual.' The court did suggest, however, that if Title VII
was applied to same-sex claims, the "fact of homosexuality (to include
bisexuality) should be considered an essential element of the claim, to be
alleged and proved., 55 Furthermore, the court stated that proof of a
harasser's homosexuality must include more than " merely suggestive"
conduct. 6 In sum, the court concluded: "There perhaps 'ought to be a
law against' such puerile and repulsive workplace behavior even when it
involves only heterosexual workers of the same sex, in order to protect
the victims against its indignities and debilitations, but we conclude that
Title VII is not that law."
Soon after deciding McWilliams, the Fourth Circuit once again ad-
dressed a same-sex harassment claim, and once again highlighted the
limitations of the McWilliams holding., In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
48. Id. at 1195.
49. Id. at 1195; See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
50. McWilliams, 72 F.3d 1191 at 1195-96.
51. Id. at 1196.
52. Id.
53. Id at 1195 n.4.
54. Id.
55. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.5. (4th Cir.
1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
56. Id
57. Id. at 1196.
58. See id. at 1195 n.4.
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Electric Co.," the Fourth Circuit dismissed a "hostile work environ-
ment" claim involving two males. Judge Niemeyer, writing as part of
the majority, concluded that a same-sex sexual harassment claim could
be actionable given the "appropriate circumstances. ' 'W Specifically, the
majority concluded that "sexual harassment of a male employee ... by
another male ... may be actionable under Title VII if the basis for the
harassment is because the employee is a man.",6' Although the court
provided a lengthy discussion on the history of the causal element in a
same-sex claim, the court never actually reached the issue of whether
the harassment in Hopkins was based upon the employee's sex.62 Such
an analysis was effectively precluded by the court's determination that
the claimant did not establish the requisite severity for a "hostile work
environment claim."63 Nevertheless, the court stressed that a correct
analysis under Title VII would focus on an employee's status as a man
or woman, regardless of the employer's gender.'
In 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Quick v.
Donaldson Co.,' became the first federal appellate court to recognize
the viability of same-sex claims, specifically including claims in which
both the perpetrator and the victim are heterosexuals. 6 In its reasoning,
the court offered the broad statement that if "members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous ... conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed," Title VII's causal element is
satisfied.67 This rationale directly contradicted the equally broad lan-
guage of Garcia that expressly barred same-sex cases from ever satisfy-
ing Title VII's causal element.6 Moreover, the Quick court rejected the
McWilliams court's suggestion that a harasser must be proven to be ho-
mosexual or bisexual, effectively removing any discussion of a harasser's
59. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
60. Id. at 751.
61. Id. at 752 (emphasis added). But see McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 (dismissing hostile
environment claim because both the alleged harasser and the claimant were heterosexual
males).
62. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 754.
63. Id. at 753.
64. Id. at 752.
65. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
66. Id. at 1379.
67. Id. at 1378.
68. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994); see also McWil-
liams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
[Vol. 81:161
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
motive from a proper analysis of same-sex harassment claims." Under
Quick, whether a harasser acts "because of" perversion, attraction, or
sheer cruelty, if the harasser treats members of one sex disparately from
the other sex, federal law covers the conduct.0
While the Quick decision provided hope for future same-sex claim-
ants, it did not resolve the contradictive rationale among the circuits.
Just months after deciding Quick, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit revisited same-sex sexual harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc..71 In Oncale, the court was encumbered with
graphic and egregious facts including forceful acts of sexual perversion
among males.' The Fifth Circuit discarded the judicial trend of other
circuits to entertain the possibility of same-sex claim viability.73 Instead,
the court concluded they were bound by Garcia and dismissed the vic-
tim's claim.74
The disparity among the federal appellate decisions, particularly be-
tween Quick and Garcia, has presented courts, such as the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Wrightson, with inconsistent analyses regarding
the viability of same-sex harassment claims.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
A. The Opinion
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina in Wrightson relied heavily upon the vague, yet preclusive, ra-
tionale of Garcia.75 However, the appellate court chose to pursue a dif-
ferent approach. In an opinion authored by Judge Luttig, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals narrowly held that a same-sex "hostile work
environment" sexual harassment claim is viable under Title VII, pro-
69. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
70. Id.; see also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
71. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
72. Id. at 118. Oncale alleged that co-workers had held him down while his supervisor
placed his genitals upon Oncale's neck; that on another occasion his supervisor threatened
him with homosexual rape; and yet on another occasion Oncale's supervisor used force to
push a bar of soap into Oncale's anus. Id.
73. Id. at 118.
74. Id. at 119. The court did entertain the argument that Garcia's language striking
down male-to-male claims was merely dicta. Id. at 120. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that Garcia is binding precedent. Id.
75. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 367, 368 (W.D.N.C. 1995), rev'd,
99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
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vided that the perpetrator is homosexual.76
In reaching this conclusion, the majority initially reiterated the ele-
ments of a prima facie "hostile work environment" claim.n The court
then focused on the crucial causation language of Title VII,7  pointing
out that an employer of either sex who only treats employees of the
same sex in an abusive or hostile way, would be discriminating because
of the employee's sex.79 Likewise, an employer who only treats employ-
ees of the opposite sex adversely would be discriminating because of
sex.Y The court concluded that Howard would not have harassed
Wrightson but for the fact that Wrightson was a male.' In sum, the
court of appeals clearly rejected the district court's interpretation of Ti-
tle VII to require that a claimant and a perpetrator be of opposite
sexes. 
2
The court also employed the persuasive guidance of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") compliance manual,
noting the manual's explicit recognition of same-sex sexual harassment."
The court specifically pointed out the manual's utilization of an exem-
plary fact pattern similar to the facts in Wrightson.,4 Applying the
76. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141.
77. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 142.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
82. Id. at 142. The court stated that:
Through its proscription of "employer" discrimination against "individual" employ-
ees, the statute obviously places no gender limitation whatsoever on the perpetrator
or the target of the harassment. Therefore, the only possible source of condition
that the harasser and victim be of different sexes is Title VII's causal requirement
that the discrimination be "because of" the employee's sex. In this causal require-
ment we find no such limitation either .... There is ... simply no "logical connection"
between [the] requirement that the discrimination be "because of" the employee's
sex and a requirement that a harasser and victim be of different sexes.
Id.
83. Id. The compliance manual specifically states: "[t]he victim does not have to be of
the opposite sex from the harasser ... [T]he crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a
member or members of one sex differently from members of the other sex." EEOC Compl.
Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987).
84. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143. The manual's text reads:
Example 1-If a male supervisor of male and female employees makes unwelcome
sexual advances toward a male employee because the employee is male but does not
make similar advances toward female employees, then the male supervisor's con-
duct may constitute sexual harassment since the disparate treatment is based on the
male employee's sex.
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EEOC's interpretation, the court reasoned that a homosexual male su-
pervisor's "unwelcome sexual advances" towards male employees but
not towards female employees violated Title VII.
Additionally, the court addressed Pizza Hut of America's contention
that Wrightson's claim was truly based upon his sexual orientation.'
Acknowledging that a claim based upon sexual orientation is not ac-
tionable under Title VII, the court clarified that discrimination based
upon sexual orientation was never alleged in this caseY Moreover, the
court took its analysis one step further, holding that if Wrightson had
concurrently alleged discrimination based upon the fact he was a male
and the fact he was a heterosexual, the claim would still be actionable.'
The court reasoned that the words "because of' cannot be equated with
the words "solely because of."' Thus, according to the majority opin-
ion, " Title VII meant to condemn even those [claims] based on a mix-
ture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. '
Lastly, the court validated other courts' predictions that expanding
Title VII would inevitably result in an influx of same-sex claims.9 De-
termining, that its role was to "faithfully interpret" Title VII,92 the court
opined that it had a duty to sustain causes of action "unmistakably pro-
vided" for by Congress.93
B. The Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Murnaghan expressed his
discord with the majority's attempt to "stretch Title VII's 'because of
sex language to include 'unmanageably broad protection of the sensibili-
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987).
85. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143.
86. Id. Pizza Hut contended that even if a same-sex harassment claim is actionable un-
der Title VII, Wrightson's claim must still be dismissed because the harassment was not be-
cause he was male, but rather because he was heterosexual. Id.
87. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995). The complaint specifically alleged that Wrightson was
"discriminated against 'because of his sex, male."' Id. at 143.
88. Id at 144.
89. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989)).
90. Id.
91. Id. ("[W]e recognize and appreciate the reasons for reticence of many of the federal
courts to recognize a cause of action under Title VII for same-sex discrimination. We, as
they, have no doubt that an expanded interpretation of Title VII will result in a significant
increase in litigation under this antidiscrimination provision.").
92- Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
93. Id.
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ties of workers simply in matters of sex."'94 Murnaghan reiterated that
Title VII was not enacted to rid the workplace of all insulting and dis-
tasteful behavior.95 Instead, he posited that claims similar to Wright-
son's should be filed under state tort or employment law."
Additionally, the dissenting opinion accused the majority of charac-
terizing Title VII's lack of legislative history as a "license to legislate"
and "[a license] to include claims never intended, nor contemplated, by
Congress. ' Judge Murnaghan looked to the outright preclusive lan-
guage of Garcia as well as the "merely shameful behavior" analysis from
McWilliams in concluding that "Title VII was not intended, nor does the
statute provide, a path for Wrightson to obtain the relief he seeks." 98
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The Fourth Circuit reached the correct result in Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of America, Inc. although it did not go far enough. A male em-
ployee, like Wrightson, who was forced to endure relentless verbal and
physical harassment because he happened to be a male, should be af-
forded a cause of action under Title VII. However, an employee such as
Wrightson should be afforded that cause of action regardless of his har-
asser's sexual orientation. The Wrightson decision's primary strength is
the recognition of same-sex claims as cognizable under Title VII. The
decision is flawed, however, insofar as it characterizes such cognizability
as dependent upon the harasser's sexual orientation.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Under federal law, employment discrimination claims are bound by
Title VII. As in all cases of statutory interpretation, the starting point of
a thorough analysis is the plain language employed by Congress. Title
VII's plain language clearly prohibits discrimination "because of" an in-
dividual's sex.99 By failing to clearly define the term "sex," Congress ef-
fectively "relinquished the duty to delineate proscribed behavior in the
94. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (quoting McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Su-
pervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996)).
95. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144 (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745,
755 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996)).
96. Id. The dissenting opinion suggested assault, battery, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and respondeat superior liability as alternative causes of action. Id.
97. Id. at 145.
98. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145-46 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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workplace relating to 'sex' in the judiciary."' ° Critics of a broad inter-
pretation of the term "sex," like Judge Murnaghan in the Wrightson dis-
sent, argue that regardless of the statute's plain meaning, courts are ig-
noring the historical context within which Title VII was enacted.''
Analogously, a majority of the legislative discussions with regard to Ti-
tle VI's inclusion of the word "race" focused on the disparate treatment
of African Americans in the workforce.' °2 However, Title VII's protec-
tion is not denied "to other racial groups, such as Asian Americans or
even white Americans, because the legislative history did not support
such a finding."1 3 Title VII, in general, was enacted with the "broad
philosophical proposition" of "bring[ing] about equal opportunity in
employment."l The statute encompasses people of all religions, all col-
ors, all races, all national origins and all sexes.'O
The Wrightson court correctly summarized: "[W]here Congress has
unmistakably provided a cause of action, as it has through the plain lan-
guage of Title VII, [the courts] are without authority in the guise of in-
terpretation to deny that such exists, whatever the practical conse-
quences."'6 In this sense, Wrightson "demonstrates the wisdom of the
Constitution's three branches of government, which leaves to the legis-
lative branch, not the judiciary, the task of making the law."' Thus,
pursuant to Title VII's language, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit legitimately reasoned that it was compelled to afford Wrightson
a cause of action given the fact that female employees were not sub-
jected to the same abusive and offensive conduct."
As Judge Murnaghan pointed out in his Wrightson dissent, all offen-
sive conduct cannot conceivably be eliminated from the workplace via
Title VII.' The conduct in Wrightson, as well as the conduct in the
majority of previously discussed cases, is not merely "offensive" or
"tasteless."'0 A graphic joke might be "tasteless." Displaying a sexual
100. Shahan, supra note 24, at 510.
101. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (Murnaghan J., dissenting).
102. Papish, supra note 20, at 214-15 n.63.
103. Id.
104. Deering, supra note 34, at 271.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
106. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144.
107. Id at 145 (J. Murnaghan, dissenting).
108. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
109. Id. at 144 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
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photo or cartoon might be "offensive." However, the groping of one's
sexual anatomy, the relentless sexual propositions by a supervisor, the
forceful penetration of a body cavity with a foreign object, and the ob-
sessive inquiry and discussion about graphic, perverted sexual acts, are
more than just "offensive" and "tasteless." Such actions are appalling,
abusive, and hostile, and should be recognized as such. Moreover, if
such actions are paired with the fact that only one sex is subjected to
such abuse, these actions are sexually discriminatory under Title VII.
Courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Garcia, which have failed to recog-
nize same-sex sexual harassment, have given homosexual and bisexual
harassers "free rein to victimize same-sex employees without the threat
of liability." ''
B. Sexual Orientation as a Required Element
The Fourth Circuit's analytical weakness lies specifically in restrict-
ing viability to same-sex claims in which the harasser is homosexual."'
In Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit refuted the assertion that Title VII re-
quires a claimant and a perpetrator be of opposite sexes.' However, in
doing so, the court created a new requirement: that the perpetrator and
claimant be of different sexual preferences."' This is incorrect reason-
ing. Whether a claim involves homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual
parties, discriminating against an employee "because of' an employee's
sex is unlawful."'
Instead, the Wrightson court should have impelled its analysis to-
wards the Eighth Circuit's expansive interpretation of Title VII in
Quick."6 The details of a perpetrator's sexual orientation should not be
at issue in a Title VII claim as the Wrightson court suggests, since "'[a]n
employer ... never [has] a legitimate reason' for creating ... a hostile
work environment" based upon an employee's sex."7 Requiring an em-
ployee to offer proof of the harasser's sexual orientation is a step back-
wards in the realm of civil rights. Furthermore, as Judge Michael sug-
gested in his McWilliams dissent, requiring a claimant to offer proof of
111. Shahan, supra note 24, at 526.
112. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see also Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
116. See Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1377-80 (8th Cir. 1996).
117. Id. at 1378 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the harasser's sexual orientation "puts too fine a point" on the causal
element.' 8 In due time, the focus of Title VII claims would inevitable
shift from the harassment's substantive and factual nature to a mingled
and misleading inquisition into the "'true' sexual orientation of the har-
asser.' 19 The unavoidable result would be a dangerous vehicle for un-
precedented judicial pursuits into the personal lives of private citizens,
as well as a chilling effect on what would otherwise be legitimate claims.
In sum, the Wrightson court's attempt to distinguish between hetero-
sexual-heterosexual harassment and heterosexual-homosexual harass-
ment "produces a result more discriminatory than a ruling [such as]
Garcia that same sex discrimination is not covered by Title VII.' 20 The
merit of a claim should be based upon a harasser's actual conduct, not
upon his or her hidden agenda. As Judge Murnaghan stated in his dis-
sent, Title VII "was intended to lessen, not to increase, discrimina-
tion. , 12
C. Subsequent Cases
Subsequent to Wrightson, several circuits have followed suit, holding
that same-sex sexual harassment claims are indeed actionable under
federal law. In Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs.,'2 the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the sexual harassment of a male waiter by a ho-
mosexual male manager was actionable under Title VII.' Likewise, the
Sixth Circuit, in Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.,'24 recently
affirmed a district court's decision not to dismiss a similar claim.'"
Until this past summer, the United States Supreme Court had re-
peatedly declined to address the issue of same-sex sexual harassment.
However, on June 9, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
118. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
119. 1d
120. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d. 138, 145 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'g 909 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 1504. The court specifically reserved the issue addressed in McWilliams (a
heterosexual male perpetrator and a heterosexual male claimant) for future decisions. Id. at
1507.
124. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
125. Id at 448. The court added to its analysis the concept of sexual attraction, noting
that "all that is necessary for [the court] to observe is that when a male sexually propositions
another male because of sexual attraction, there can be little question that the behavior is a
form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is a male." Id.
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Oncale case.26 The future implications of Wrightson, therefore, are cur-
rently uncertain, but soon to be decided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in deciding Wrightson
v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., undoubtedly strengthened the impetus
that eventually forced the Supreme Court of the United States to grant
certiorari to the petitioner in Oncale. While the Wrightson court ex-
panded Title VII's scope by affording a cause of action to those who are
sexually discriminated against by a homosexual supervisor of the same
sex, other circuits' decisions that categorically deny relief to same-sex
claimants remain intact. The time has come for consistent judicial rec-
ognition that all Americans, male or female, should be afforded re-
dressibility against employers who discriminate because of the em-
ployee's sex.
Without a doubt, as the traditional makeup of the workforce, as well
as the nation's acceptance of alternative lifestyles, continues to change,
so will the types of discrimination cases. It is the Supreme Court's task
to address the disparity among the appellate courts' decisions and pro-
vide the requisite leadership for maintaining equality in the workplace.
Before the conclusion of the Court's current term, such an interpreta-
tion will assuredly occur, and the ultimate fate of same-sex claims will be
resolved.
COLLEEN LINEHAN
126. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
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